CFIC Fights to Maintain Religious Privilege

Reply to L. Rosenblood’s Free Inquiry article

2026-04-21

CFIC promotes the maintenance of a major religious privilege—i.e. its symbols must never be banned anywhere—not enjoyed by other ideologies such as political, while simultaneously claiming that religious symbols cannot be defined.

Ce blogue est disponible en français : CFIC lutte pour le maintien du privilège religieux

In a recent article “Quebec’s Bill 21 Fails the Secularism Test” on the website of Free Inquiry, Leslie Rosenblood (LR) of the Centre for Inquiry Canada (CFIC) attempts to convince himself—but fails to convince the reader—that he can be a secularist while simultaneously opposing vanguard secular legislation adopted by the Canadian province of Quebec. According to the introductory note, his article is a response to my text, “Quebec: Vanguard of Secularism in North America,” although he ignores most of my arguments.

Rosenblood’s article lays out a plethora of false and sometimes ludicrous assertions.

LR claims that “Bill 21 infringes on freedom of religion” but he fails to distinguish between religious belief and religious practice. The former is a part of freedom of conscience, as are freedom from religious belief and freedom of apostasy. Religious practice, on the other hand, is part of freedom of expression which may be legitimately limited in specific contexts, such as the workplace, as Bill 21 does. Bill 21 constitutes a modest limitation on religious practice in a specific context and for the greater good, i.e. to protect the freedom of conscience of civil service users and schoolchildren.

LR totally dismisses the issue of proselytism, claiming that there is no “compelling argument that merely observing someone wearing a religion symbol is tantamount to religious coercion.” His use of the word “someone” is particularly misleading. We are not talking about just anyone, but specifically about State agents, employees of the State, on the job, who exercise coercive or moral authority, such as judges, police officers and schoolteachers. The significance of any symbols they may wear is greatly intensified by their authority which is supported by the State.

Why do corporations spend huge sums of money on advertising, promoting their products, logos and symbols? Because such advertising displays work! They do more than merely sell product: they serve to normalize the company’s identity, so that the public will accept its ubiquity. That is precisely why Islamists, for example, promote the presence of the hijab and similar Islamic veils anywhere and everywhere, i.e. in order to normalize their presence. If a person chooses to use their body as a walking billboard for a specific religion by wearing its symbols, that is their right in their private life, off the job. But the State has good reason to object to this for its employees.

LR never considers the effect of proselytism on civil service users and, especially, on schoolchildren. Their freedom of conscience must be given priority over the freedom of religious practice of State employees. That is what Bill 21 does. Consider, for example, the case of a teenage girl from a practicing Muslim family whose parents are pressuring her, against her will, to start wearing the hijab. Now suppose that she arrives at school one morning and finds that her teacher is wearing a hijab. She will in all probability experience this as a form of betrayal. The teacher’s behavior constitutes a lack of professional ethics.

In the absence of compelling evidence that such symbols have no effect, it is reasonable to ban them for State employees in positions of authority, as a precautionary measure.

The burden of proof falls not on the supporters of religious symbol bans but on opponents. In the absence of compelling evidence that such symbols have no effect, it is reasonable to ban them for State employees in positions of authority, as a precautionary measure.

LR claims that Bill 21 violates separation between religion and State. This is obviously false. Bill 21 does precisely the opposite. By banning civil servants from displaying partisan religious symbols while on the job (what they wear off the job is their own business), Bill 21 separates religious practice from the State. LR’s accusation is dishonest.

After falsely accusing Bill 21 of violating the principle of religion-State separation, LR then admits that CFIC’s definition of secularism does not include that principle but amounts to only “government neutrality in matters of religion.” Mere neutrality means that religions may interfere in government affairs, as long as all religions are allowed to do so, and that is indeed what results if civil servants are allowed to wear obvious religious symbols while on the job.

LR is not promoting State religious neutrality. On the contrary, he is promoting State impotence in the face of religious interference.

LR argues that religious neutrality implies that the State cannot define what is and what is not a religious symbol. His assertion is ludicrous. There is no ambiguity about the significance of a crucifix, a hijab, a niqab or a Sikh turban. LR is not promoting State religious neutrality. On the contrary, he is promoting State impotence in the face of religious interference.

LR suggests that there is something morally dubious about Bill 21’s use of the Canadian constitution’s “notwithstanding” clause as protection against judicial challenge. However, that clause is itself part of the constitution, and is well understood as implying that, in case of disagreement between the legislative and judicial branches of government, the former has the final say. Furthermore, LR fails to mention that the constitution, adopted in 1982 by nine of Canada’s ten provinces, was not and has never since been endorsed by the Quebec government. Quebec is legally required to comply with the constitution, and it has done so. But if one wishes to make moral judgements, Quebec has been the victim of an immoral legal maneuver, not the perpetrator.

LR argues that bans are counterproductive and may “backfire and lead to an increase in the proscribed activity.” By such logic, all speed limits on streets and highways should be repealed. We might as well repeal the entire Criminal Code too.

LR never mentions political symbols, so I assume that he has no objection to the State banning civil servants from wearing partisan political symbols on the job, as is the case (and has been for many years) in many jurisdictions including the Canadian federal State and several provinces. For example, in 2017, an Ontario judge was suspended for 30 days for wearing a MAGA hat while presiding in court, but I have heard no outcry about that disciplinary action. If it is impossible to recognize religious symbols, as LR alleges, then how is it possible to recognize political symbols? Furthermore, how is it possible to distinguish between the two categories, religious and political?

To summarize, Leslie Rosenblood, speaking for CFIC, promotes the maintenance of a religious privilege—i.e. its symbols must never be banned anywhere—not enjoyed by other ideologies (such as political) while simultaneously claiming that religious symbols cannot be defined. His inconsistency is blatant. To restore some semblance of consistency, I suggest that CFIC change its name to CRPC, i.e. Centre for Religious Privilege Canada.


Addendum: A Simple Thought Experiment

Let us suppose that a provincial government—say Ontario, or Quebec, or any other—decided that henceforth the main entrance to every government building, every public school, every public university and every public hospital would be decorated with a giant crucifix, two metres high. What would be the general reaction to this decision? Well, for one thing, every secularist, including me, would protest loudly such an egregious display of religious partisanship.

But what would Leslie Rosenblood and the Centre for Inquiry Canada do or say? Since Mr. Rosenblood, speaking as Secular Chair of CFIC, has declared that the State is incapable of determining what is a religious symbol and what is not, how can he or CFIC make such a determination? When challenged, the provincial government could simply affirm that their choice of symbol is purely aesthetic and decorative, with no religious intention. Any objection to their decision could be based only on other considerations such as cost or taste. No secular argument could be made to criticize the decision.

Thank you CFIC for making it impossible to counter aggressive religious intrusion in State affairs.


Next blog: CFIC lutte pour le maintien du privilège religieux

Quebec: Vanguard of Secularism in North America

Free Inquiry

2026-02-13

The article Quebec: Vanguard of Secularism in North America is published on the website of the American freethought magazine Free Inquiry, published by the Center for Inquiry (CFI) in the USA. A few excerpts from the article are shown below.

Sommaire en français Ce texte, « Le Québec, à l’avant-garde en matière de laïcité en Amérique du Nord » est paru sur le site web de la revue américaine Free Inquiry, une publication du Center for Inquiry (CFI) aux États-Unis. En voici quelques extraits.

[…]

On June 16, 2019, Quebec adopted Bill 21, Loi sur la laïcité de l’État or An Act respecting the laicity of the State. The word “laicity” is a dubious translation from the French “laïcité” and should arguably be replaced by the more familiar English term secularism. Nevertheless, the use of that term in this legislation is a reminder that Quebec takes its cue from France, where secularism necessarily includes the principle of separation between religion and state, not merely religious neutrality. Whereas in the English-speaking world, the separation principle tends to be given only lip service.

[…]

Another law, Bill 9 or An Act respecting the reinforcement of laicity in Québec, was proposed by the Quebec government on November 27. This bill would implement several of the Pelchat-Rousseau Committee’s recommendations. […] Unfortunately, Bill 9 as proposed, Bill 94 as adopted, and Bill 21 as adopted some six years previously, contain no provision to curtail the fiscal privileges currently granted to religious institutions. Furthermore, all three contain a so-called “grandfather” clause that allows an exemption from the religious symbol ban for employees on staff when the law was first proposed. Thus, much remains to be done. Nevertheless, each of these bills constitutes a major step forward.

While Quebec makes steady progress toward secularism, Canada at the federal level stagnates as a soft theocracy (to borrow an expression from Australian secularist Max Wallace). Canada’s head of state is King Charles III, also titular head of the Church of England. The very first line of the Constitution Act of 1982 (which is also the first line of the much-overrated Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) declares that “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law.” (Note also the oxymoronic nature of that declaration.)

[…]

Federal Canadian legislation is riddled with religious privileges, probably the most egregious being the religious exception (paragraphs 319(3)b and 319(3.1)), in the Hate Propaganda section of the Criminal Code, which grants immunity to religious speech.

[…]

Support for and opposition to Bill 21 are almost perfectly aligned with linguistic differences. Secularism enjoys overwhelming support from the Quebec population. Secular organizations in Quebec are unanimous in their support. But in Canada outside Quebec, the opposition from politicians and media is ferocious, often expressed in extreme language containing elements of anti-Québécois ethnic bigotry. Nevertheless, even in English Canada, popular opinion does not necessarily agree with the knee-jerk opposition so obvious among political and media elites.

[…]

See also:


Next blog: Supreme Court Must Respect Quebec’s Democratic Choice of Bill 21

Burden of Proof

Expose False Symmetries & Weed Out Spurious Arguments

2023-05-08

When two opposing points of view confront each other, it must not be assumed that they are symmetric, i.e. that they are both about equally plausible. That may sometimes occur, but often one side is much less plausible than the other. When one side of the debate is highly implausible and extraordinary, then the burden of proof falls on those who advance that side.

Sommaire en français Lorsque deux points de vue opposés s’affrontent, il ne faut pas supposer que la situation est symétrique, c’est-à-dire que les deux côtés sont à peu près également plausibles. Cela peut parfois se produire, mais souvent l’un des deux côtés est beaucoup moins plausible que l’autre. Lorsqu’un côté du débat est hautement invraisemblable et extraordinaire, le fardeau de la preuve incombe à ceux qui avancent de ce point de vue.

The concept of burden of proof is an important logical tool which allows us to weed out spurious arguments. It does so by exposing the falsehood of alleged symmetry between two opposing arguments or, in some cases, completely inverting the apparent plausibility of the two opposing sides. We say that one of the opposing sides has the burden of proof when they are making a specific assertion which requires substantiation, whereas the other side is simply expressing scepticism.

Those who take an irrational position, whether out of ignorance, confusion or dishonesty, generally fail to take account of this aspect of the debate. Sometimes they argue for symmetry in a situation where in fact there is no symmetry between the opposing sides of the debate. Worse, they may assume, sometimes unconsciously, that the burden of proof falls on the wrong side.

The basic idea here is summed up in several famous quotations. Science educator Carl Sagan, in his famous television programme Cosmos, declared that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” The statement by Christopher Hitchens that “what can be asserted without evidence can also be dismissed without evidence” has become known as Hitchens’ Razor. The ancient Greek mathematician and geometer Euclid made a very similar statement, “what has been affirmed without proof can also be denied without proof”, more than two millenia before. Thus, the burden of proof falls upon the person who makes some extraordinary claim. The opponent who merely questions that claim has no such obligation.

I will illustrate using the following three examples.

(1) Does “God” Exist?

An individual claims that “God” exists. However, another individual disagrees, claiming that knowledge of the existence of such an entity is unavailable. Clearly, the burden of proof here falls upon the person making the claim of god’s existence, starting with the obligation of defining what they mean by “God.” In the absence of such definition or proof, anyone who disagrees may simply dismiss the claim and is under no obligation whatsoever to prove the non-existence of the hypothetical god proposed by the claimant. There is no symmetry between the god-hypothesis and the rejection of that hypothesis. In other words, there is no symmetry between theism and atheism.

(2) What Does “God” Say About Sex?

An individual claims to know what “God” wants in some situation. For example, the individual may claim that god abhors sexual behaviour other than heterosexual relations between a man and a woman who are legally married to each other and that all other sexual behaviour is forbidden. However, another individual disagrees, claiming that no such rule is known to apply. Which individual is right? Clearly, the burden of proof falls upon the individual making the assertion about the will of “God” because that assertion requires knowledge of the existence of god, knowledge that god has a will and knowledge of that will itself. Unless the first individual offers some proof in support of their claim, those who disagree may simply dismiss it. There is no symmetry between the two sides of this disagreement.

(3) Do Symbols Communicate Anything?

A government introduces legislation which bans civil servants and public schoolteachers from wearing religious symbols while on duty. Opponents of the proposed law claim that the ban is unnecessary because, in their opinion, such symbols have no significant effect either on users of civil services or on public school pupils. Supporters of the law disagree. On which side should the burden of proof fall? This situation may appear less obvious that the previous two. Perhaps we have a symmetrical situation here, where the competing assertions are about equally plausible, where neither claim is extraordinary?

However, upon closer inspection, any apparent symmetry disappears. Why do some religious believers wear religious symbols? They do so to communicate their religious identity to others, i.e. in order to assert that identity ostentatiously. If such symbols had no effect, believers would not wear them. Pious Christians use the verb “witness” to describe the act of asserting one’s Christian identity by word or by symbol. Why do corporations spend enormous amounts of money on advertising, using symbols, logos, slogans, etc. to promote their products and/or their brand? They do so because advertising works, because such displays influence those who are exposed to them and change their behaviour in some way.

Thus, It is eminently reasonable to expect that religious symbols will have a real effect on those who witness them. Furthermore, we can expect a particularly significant effect if the wearer is a civil servant or schoolteacher on duty, especially if the observer is a child. In fact, some forms of advertising directed at children are forbidden by law, and for good reason. To assert that such symbols would have no effect—or only harmless effect—is an extraordinary claim which can be rejected in the absence of proof of such innocuousness. A precautionary attitude requires that we take the potential effects of religious symbols seriously.

Conclusion

Of course, some extraordinary claims may turn out to be valid, but only if solid supporting evidence is provided. But in the three examples given above, the claimants never succeed in providing such evidence for their extraordinary claim.


Next blog: Sur l’extrémisme trans

Religious Symbol & Face-Covering Bans in Other Countries

Quebec Bill 21 is only one of many such laws

2021-12-26, Updated 2021-12-27

What opponents of Bill 21 never talk about: the many laws in other countries which stipulate similar bans, but often stronger, more extensive ones.

Sommaire en français Ce dont les opposants à la Loi 21 ne parlent jamais : les nombreuses lois dans d’autres pays qui prévoient des interdictions similaires, mais souvent plus fortes, plus étendues. La compilation des données est disponible en français : Lois restreignant les couvre-visage et les signes religieux

Many other countries have laws similar to Bill 21, but often stronger. For example:

  • Religious symbols are banned for public servants in France, in Geneva and in two “Länder” of Germany. In particular, the Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland bans religious symbols throughout the civil service, but with the proviso that it applies when the employee is in contact with the public.
  • Religious symbols are banned in public schools in France, parts of Belgium and in Pennsylvania.
  • Face-coverings are banned in public in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Chad, Denmark, Egypt, France, Morocco, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, etc. Morocco also bans the manufacture and sale of the burqa.
  • Face-coverings are banned in public services (employees and users, as in Quebec) in Italy [Lombardy], Malaysia, Netherlands and Tunisia.
  • Face-coverings are banned for public servants in Algeria and Germany.

When it comes to restrictions on religious symbols and/or face-coverings, there are two extreme positions:

  1. Ban them everywhere. I have only known one person who held such a draconian view.
  2. Ban them nowhere. This extremist position is apparently held by most opponents of Quebec Bill 21 (because they rarely specify any alternative, just a complete repeal).

A reasonable position is somewhere in between these two extremes: i.e. ban religious symbols (for secular reasons) and face-coverings (for reasons of security, identification, communication and women’s rights) in contexts where a ban will not unduely encroach upon some people’s freedoms while it protects others’ freedoms. That is precisely what Bill 21 does, although it is a little too weak and needs to be extended to the entire civil service.

Secularists choose a position somewhere midway between the two extremes, not because it is midway (that would be just the Fallacy of the Mean) but because in this situation it maximizes human rights, whereas the two extremes threaten such rights. Banning religious symbols worn by civil servants while on the job extends everyone’s freedom from religion, while putting only a small, well-circumscribed restriction on freedom of religious expression (i.e. religious practice) for State employees. Such a ban puts no restriction whatsoever on freedom of religious belief. In other words, it treats religious expression similar to how political expression is treated: with some restriction in the workplace.

The extremist position (2) holds that any ban is an encroachment on personal freedoms. This is libertarianism on steroids and is unacceptable because it gives absolute freedom to the wearer while completely neglecting the rights of others.

By adopting Bill 21 in June of 2019, Quebec joined the many countries listed above. In reaction, the arrogance and ignorance of Canadian anti-secularists have been infinite. Will they now claim that all those countries are populated or controlled by Christian supremacists with nefarious motives?

The page Laws Restricting Face-Coverings and Religious Symbols provides a compilation with full details. I update it periodically. Please let me know if you find any errors or omissions. (Links to relevant on-line articles are helpful. Links to actual legislation are even better.)


Next blog: Repeal Citizenship Regulation 17.1.b

Passive Proselytism

2020-12-16

The wearing of religious symbols by civil servants and teachers on duty is a form of unacceptable religious advertising and an undeserved privilege granted to believers.

Sommaire en français Le port de signes religieux par les fonctionnaires et enseignant(e)s au travail est une forme de publicité religieuse inacceptable et un privilège indu accordé aux croyant(e)s. Voir mon blogue précédent Le prosélytisme passif.

The recent (2020-12-08) press release from Atheist Freethinkers gives the following explanation of the importance of banning State employees from wearing religious symbols:

[…] to allow civil servants and schoolteachers to indulge in ideological displays while on the job, simply because their ideology is religious, constitutes an unjustifiable privilege for religions. The consequences of this privilege are (1) an infringement on the freedom of conscience of users of social services and students in public schools, by exposing them to passive proselytism and indoctrination which these partisan religious manifestations exemplify; and (2) […]

One of the strategies of opponents of Bill 21, that is, anti-secularists, is to deny that passive proselytism even exists. To deny the reality of this phenomenon is very dishonest and in extremely bad faith. This is obvious.

When we are exposed to advertising on television, or in a print magazine, or on a billboard, we are being targeted by passive proselytism of the commercial variety. No-one can deny the effectiveness of this proselytism—and even less so its very existence! Businesses spend millions of dollars on such publicity—because it works.

If we allow civil servants in the public service or in schools to wear and display religious symbols while on the job, then we are dealing with passive proselytism of the religious type. Just replace the kippah, crucifix or hijab with a large promotion for McDonald’s or any other product for sale, displayed on the clothing of the civil servant, and the result is an advertisment which is obviously unacceptable. The kippah, crucifix and hijab similarly constitute unacceptable publicity in this context.

the purpose of religious proselytism is not necessarily to convert anyone, just as the goal of commercial advertising is not always to sell a product directly.

We must keep in mind that the purpose of religious proselytism is not necessarily to convert anyone, just as the goal of commercial advertising is not always to sell a product directly. Instead, the purpose is often to promote a particular brand or ideology, to normalize or trivialize the presence of that brand, so that it will be accepted and recognized by the public who are exposed to it.

In fact, a common practice among anti-secularists is to insist on a very narrow definition of the word proselytism, limiting it to mean the intention of converting others to the religion of the symbol worn. This is usually followed by a demand that quantitative studies be used to prove that such symbols do indeed have a proselytic effect. This is completely illogical.

In November 2020, Patrick Taillon testified before Quebec Superior Court as an expert witness for the Attorney-General of Quebec (AGQ) in the case Hak versus AGQ. In a radio interview with Antoine Robitaille, Taillon explains that, in 2015 when the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the ban on prayers at municipal council meetings of the city of Saguenay, there was no requirement for quantitative studies of the effect of prayers on those persons who attended the meetings. The Court similarly did not require that the atheist complainant prove that the prayer could have converted him to Christianity. The wearing of religious symbols by agents of the State constitutes a similar situation. It is not necessary to prove explicitly that religious symbols have an effect on those exposed to them, especially if those persons are children.

[…] internal religious proselytism—that is, proselytism targeted at people of the same religion as the wearer of the symbol.

It is also important to recognize the importance of internal religious proselytism—that is, proselytism targeted at people of the same religion as the wearer of the symbol. This is generally the purpose of the Islamic veil, to send the message that the woman wearing it is a good, pure Muslim, while those Muslim women who do not wear the veil are bad, impure Muslims who deserve to end up in hell and should therefore adopt the veil in order to avoid that fate.

To allow teachers to wear religious symbols is tantamount to violating the right of pupils to an education free of indoctrination, in an environment free from proselytism. No quantitative study is required. The principle of secularism—in particular the principle of separation between religion and State—is sufficient to justify a ban.

the burden of proof is on such anti-secularists.

If the opponents of Bill 21 wish to grant religious believers the privilege of being allowed to engage in religious advertising while on the job, the burden of proof is on such anti-secularists. It is they who must provide proof of their claim that pupils will be unaffected.

Bill 21 establishes a reasonable compromise between the rights of State employees on the one hand and the rights of students and users of civil services on the ther hand.


Next blog: The Swiss Face-Covering Ban is About Deterring Religious Fanaticism