Reply to L. Rosenblood’s Free Inquiry article
2026-04-21
CFIC promotes the maintenance of a major religious privilege—i.e. its symbols must never be banned anywhere—not enjoyed by other ideologies such as political, while simultaneously claiming that religious symbols cannot be defined.
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In a recent article “Quebec’s Bill 21 Fails the Secularism Test” on the website of Free Inquiry, Leslie Rosenblood (LR) of the Centre for Inquiry Canada (CFIC) attempts to convince himself—but fails to convince the reader—that he can be a secularist while simultaneously opposing vanguard secular legislation adopted by the Canadian province of Quebec. According to the introductory note, his article is a response to my text, “Quebec: Vanguard of Secularism in North America,” although he ignores most of my arguments.
Rosenblood’s article lays out a plethora of false and sometimes ludicrous assertions.
LR claims that “Bill 21 infringes on freedom of religion” but he fails to distinguish between religious belief and religious practice. The former is a part of freedom of conscience, as are freedom from religious belief and freedom of apostasy. Religious practice, on the other hand, is part of freedom of expression which may be legitimately limited in specific contexts, such as the workplace, as Bill 21 does. Bill 21 constitutes a modest limitation on religious practice in a specific context and for the greater good, i.e. to protect the freedom of conscience of civil service users and schoolchildren.
LR totally dismisses the issue of proselytism, claiming that there is no “compelling argument that merely observing someone wearing a religion symbol is tantamount to religious coercion.” His use of the word “someone” is particularly misleading. We are not talking about just anyone, but specifically about State agents, employees of the State, on the job, who exercise coercive or moral authority, such as judges, police officers and schoolteachers. The significance of any symbols they may wear is greatly intensified by their authority which is supported by the State.
Why do corporations spend huge sums of money on advertising, promoting their products, logos and symbols? Because such advertising displays work! They do more than merely sell product: they serve to normalize the company’s identity, so that the public will accept its ubiquity. That is precisely why Islamists, for example, promote the presence of the hijab and similar Islamic veils anywhere and everywhere, i.e. in order to normalize their presence. If a person chooses to use their body as a walking billboard for a specific religion by wearing its symbols, that is their right in their private life, off the job. But the State has good reason to object to this for its employees.
LR never considers the effect of proselytism on civil service users and, especially, on schoolchildren. Their freedom of conscience must be given priority over the freedom of religious practice of State employees. That is what Bill 21 does. Consider, for example, the case of a teenage girl from a practicing Muslim family whose parents are pressuring her, against her will, to start wearing the hijab. Now suppose that she arrives at school one morning and finds that her teacher is wearing a hijab. She will in all probability experience this as a form of betrayal. The teacher’s behavior constitutes a lack of professional ethics.
In the absence of compelling evidence that such symbols have no effect, it is reasonable to ban them for State employees in positions of authority, as a precautionary measure.
The burden of proof falls not on the supporters of religious symbol bans but on opponents. In the absence of compelling evidence that such symbols have no effect, it is reasonable to ban them for State employees in positions of authority, as a precautionary measure.
LR claims that Bill 21 violates separation between religion and State. This is obviously false. Bill 21 does precisely the opposite. By banning civil servants from displaying partisan religious symbols while on the job (what they wear off the job is their own business), Bill 21 separates religious practice from the State. LR’s accusation is dishonest.
After falsely accusing Bill 21 of violating the principle of religion-State separation, LR then admits that CFIC’s definition of secularism does not include that principle but amounts to only “government neutrality in matters of religion.” Mere neutrality means that religions may interfere in government affairs, as long as all religions are allowed to do so, and that is indeed what results if civil servants are allowed to wear obvious religious symbols while on the job.
LR is not promoting State religious neutrality. On the contrary, he is promoting State impotence in the face of religious interference.
LR argues that religious neutrality implies that the State cannot define what is and what is not a religious symbol. His assertion is ludicrous. There is no ambiguity about the significance of a crucifix, a hijab, a niqab or a Sikh turban. LR is not promoting State religious neutrality. On the contrary, he is promoting State impotence in the face of religious interference.
LR suggests that there is something morally dubious about Bill 21’s use of the Canadian constitution’s “notwithstanding” clause as protection against judicial challenge. However, that clause is itself part of the constitution, and is well understood as implying that, in case of disagreement between the legislative and judicial branches of government, the former has the final say. Furthermore, LR fails to mention that the constitution, adopted in 1982 by nine of Canada’s ten provinces, was not and has never since been endorsed by the Quebec government. Quebec is legally required to comply with the constitution, and it has done so. But if one wishes to make moral judgements, Quebec has been the victim of an immoral legal maneuver, not the perpetrator.
LR argues that bans are counterproductive and may “backfire and lead to an increase in the proscribed activity.” By such logic, all speed limits on streets and highways should be repealed. We might as well repeal the entire Criminal Code too.
LR never mentions political symbols, so I assume that he has no objection to the State banning civil servants from wearing partisan political symbols on the job, as is the case (and has been for many years) in many jurisdictions including the Canadian federal State and several provinces. For example, in 2017, an Ontario judge was suspended for 30 days for wearing a MAGA hat while presiding in court, but I have heard no outcry about that disciplinary action. If it is impossible to recognize religious symbols, as LR alleges, then how is it possible to recognize political symbols? Furthermore, how is it possible to distinguish between the two categories, religious and political?
To summarize, Leslie Rosenblood, speaking for CFIC, promotes the maintenance of a religious privilege—i.e. its symbols must never be banned anywhere—not enjoyed by other ideologies (such as political) while simultaneously claiming that religious symbols cannot be defined. His inconsistency is blatant. To restore some semblance of consistency, I suggest that CFIC change its name to CRPC, i.e. Centre for Religious Privilege Canada.
Addendum: A Simple Thought Experiment
Let us suppose that a provincial government—say Ontario, or Quebec, or any other—decided that henceforth the main entrance to every government building, every public school, every public university and every public hospital would be decorated with a giant crucifix, two metres high. What would be the general reaction to this decision? Well, for one thing, every secularist, including me, would protest loudly such an egregious display of religious partisanship.
But what would Leslie Rosenblood and the Centre for Inquiry Canada do or say? Since Mr. Rosenblood, speaking as Secular Chair of CFIC, has declared that the State is incapable of determining what is a religious symbol and what is not, how can he or CFIC make such a determination? When challenged, the provincial government could simply affirm that their choice of symbol is purely aesthetic and decorative, with no religious intention. Any objection to their decision could be based only on other considerations such as cost or taste. No secular argument could be made to criticize the decision.
Thank you CFIC for making it impossible to counter aggressive religious intrusion in State affairs.
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